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1Abstract 
 
During a crisis, developing countries regret having issued dollar denominated debt 
because they have to pay more when they have less. Ex ante, however, they may be 
worse off issuing local currency debt because the equilibrium interest rate might rise, 
making it more expensive for them to borrow. Many authors have assumed that lenders 
and borrowers have contrary goals, and that local currency (peso) debt is better for the 
borrower (Bolivia), and dollar debt is better for the lender (America). 
We show that if each country is represented by a single consumer with quadratic 
utilities, in perfect competition, then both will agree ex ante on whether dollar debt or 
peso debt is better. (In fact all assets can be Pareto ranked). But we show that it might 
well be dollar debt that Pareto dominates. In particular, if the lender is sufficiently risk 
averse and the borrower sufficiently impatient, and the lender’s endowment is sufficiently 
riskless, then dollar debt Pareto dominates peso debt. However, if there are persistent 
gains to risk sharing between the countries, then peso debt Pareto dominates dollar debt. 
In the special case where utilities are linear in the first period and quadratic in the 
second period, we can completely characterize the Pareto ranking of any asset by a 
formula depending only on marginal utilities at autarky. 
In the more general case where utilities are linear in the first period and have positive 
third derivative in the second period, we show that when persistent gains to risk sharing 
hold, America must gain from Peso debt but Bolivia might lose. Thus the presumption 
that peso debt is more favorable to Bolivia than to America is false. 
Our framework of optimal security design can be used to demonstrate one rationale 
for credit controls. If the purchasing power of a dollar overseas varies with the quantity of 
debt issued, then both America and Bolivia can gain from capital controls, because a tax 
that reduces the quantity of Bolivian debt might make the real dollar payoffs in Bolivia 
more ‘peso-like’, and therefore under persistent gains to risk pooling, better for America 
and Bolivia. 
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Experience suggests that a country in economic crisis usually ¯nds that its currency is steeply
depreciating. If the country has borrowed heavily in foreign currency (\dollar" denominated
debt), then its plight is made all the worse by the need to pay more just when it has less.
Immediately following the Latin American crisis of 1984, Eskridge (1985) called attention to the
dangers of dollar denominated debt, and again after the Asian crisis of 1998, Frankel (2000) and
Krugman (1999) listed dollar denominated debt as one of the many factors contributing to the
¯nancial panic. Clearly the crisis would have been eased had the same borrowing, at the same
rates, been taken out in local currency. But of course had the debt been \peso" denominated
(or indexed to domestic output) in the ¯rst place, the interest rate would have been di®erent
and the level of debt would have changed.
In this paper we explore the ex ante consequences of dollar versus local currency denominated
debt in a perfectly competitive economy. We consider security design in a two agent economy
(A = America, B = Bolivia = Borrower), with one asset and one international good. We
apply the analysis to the international debt problem by assuming that the purchasing power of
each currency in each state is a function of the economic fundamentals; the better a country's
fundamentals, the higher its currency's value in terms of the international good. An alternative
interpretation is that we compare a debt-contract indexed to Bolivia's output to a debt contract
indexed to America's output. Peso denominated debt reduces Bolivia's burden when Bolivia's
income is lower. Compared to peso debt, dollar denominated debt makes Bolivia's repayment
burden harder when Bolivia's income is relatively worse than American income. Nonetheless,
the proposition that peso debt is ex ante Pareto better, or at least ex ante better for Bolivia,
turns out to be valid only under additional conditions.
When America is risk neutral and large, and Bolivian and American endowments are inversely
monotonic, we show that peso debt is always better for Bolivia than dollar debt. Bohn (1990) had
previously demonstrated the same conclusion under the additional hypotheses that American
endowments are riskless, and Bolivian utility is mean-variance. Even with the heroic assumption
of American risk-neutrality, restrictions must be placed on endowments to guarantee that peso
debt is better than dollar debt for Bolivia.
Risk neutrality is clearly an unacceptable hypothesis. Without it the question arises: is
there some restriction on endowments (or utilities) that makes peso debt better than dollar debt
for Bolivia? What about for America? If American and Bolivian endowments are inversely
monotonic, and American endowments are relatively large, in that aggregate endowments are
still inversely monotonic with Bolivian endowments, we say that there are endowment generated
persistent gains to risk pooling. Under this hypothesis at least one country must bene¯t by a
switch from dollar debt to peso debt, no matter what the utilities.
The conventional view has been that peso debt might be better for Bolivia even when it
is worse for America. We show, however, that if both America and Bolivia have quadratic
preferences, then peso debt is better for Bolivia if and only if it is better for America. Indeed
3we show that with quadratic utilities and two agents, all debt contracts can be Pareto-ranked.
Thus with quadratic utilities and endowment generated persistent gains to risk pooling, both
countries prefer peso debt to dollar debt.
When utilities are linear-quadratic, we give an explicit numerical score for each asset, equal
to the di®erence in marginal utility to A and B of the asset payo®s, evaluated at autarky. Assets
with higher score give equilibria that Pareto dominate equilibria with lower scoring assets. These
theorems permit us to describe general conditions under which peso debt Pareto dominates dollar
debt, but also conditions under which dollar debt Pareto dominates peso debt.
We show that if utilities are linear-quadratic, then dollar debt will Pareto dominate peso debt,
provided that Bolivia is su±ciently impatient, America is su±ciently risk-averse and American
endowments are su±ciently close to riskless. (These hypotheses clearly violate endowment gen-
erated persistent gains to risk pooling, since the sum of the endowments is no longer inversely
monotonic with Bolivian endowments).
When endowment generated persistent gains to risk pooling holds but utilities are not
quadratic, which country bene¯ts from peso debt? Surprisingly, that country is America! We
show that with linear-concave utilities, if u000
h ¸ 0 for h = A;B, America must always be better
o® with peso debt than dollar debt, and we give an example to show that Bolivia may be worse
o®.
Finally, we use our framework of optimal security design to demonstrate one welfare rationale
for credit controls. Suppose that the real purchasing power of the dollar in Bolivia changes with
the quantity of debt issued by Bolivia (say increasing in the quantity of debt when Bolivian
output gets lower). Taxes on foreign loans could take advantage of the externality; less loans
means the dollar debt in real terms would become more \peso-like". With quadratic utilities
(and persistent gains to risk pooling) this would help both Bolivia and America.
There is a large formal literature on the welfare gains from international risk sharing (see e.g.,
Athanasoulis-Shiller (1995), van Wincoop (1999) and the references therein). This literature,
however, treats a completely di®erent problem - the question there is how much welfare improves
with the introduction of new assets. In the context of dollar denominated debt, the important
question is how welfare changes as the payo®s of existing assets change. From a theoretical
viewpoint the analysis in this paper is closest to Demange and Laroque (1995). They characterize
Pareto-optimal asset structures in a linear Gaussian (mean-variance) setup. By contrast, in our
quadratic (mean-variance) setup, we Pareto-rank ine±cient asset structures.
We have assumed a competitive framework throughout, ignoring default and moral hazard
both on the part of the borrower and the central bank. Atkenson (1991) argues that with moral
hazard on the part of the borrowers, dollar denominated debt might be optimal.
There is also a large literature discussing the implementation of debt relief programs for
the so-called `Highly Indebted Poor Countries' (HIPC) (see e.g., Berlage et al (2000)). This
paper presents circumstances under which it would be better for the lenders as well as the HIP
countries to restructure their dollar denominated debt as local currency debt.
Our model takes price levels and exchange rates as exogenous. In a companion paper (1999)
4we introduce multiple currencies, multiple goods, and multiple agents per country and we derive
these exchange rates endogenously from preferences and bank policy.
2 The Real Economy
2.1 The Underlying Economy
Consider a model of an exchange economy with two periods and a single perishable good. There
are S possible states s = 1;:::;S in the second period, and the ¯rst period state is denoted by
s = 0. There are two agents, a lender, A (as in America), and a borrower, B (as in Bolivia),
with initial endowments eh ´ (eh
0; ~ eh) 2 RS+1
++ = R++£RS
++ and time-separable, von-Neumann-
Morgenstern utility functions




with strictly increasing, concave and C2 functions vh;uh for h = A;B. We assume the state
probabilities °s are identical across agents. The underlying economy is then described by E =
((Uh;eh)h=A;B). If all the vh and uh are quadratic, we call it a quadratic economy; if vh(x0) = x0
(constant marginal utility) and the uh quadratic, we call the economy linear-quadratic; and if
vh(x0) = x0 and the uh are strictly concave, we call the economy linear-concave.
2.2 Arrow{Debreu Equilibrium
We de¯ne an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium as a vector of prices p 2 RS+1
+ and consumptions
xh ´ (xh
0; ~ xh) 2 RS+1
+ = R+ £ RS
+, (p;(xh)h=A;B), such that
xA
s + xB
s = es ´ eA
s + eB
s for s = 0;1;:::;S
and such that for h = A;B,
xh 2 arg max
x2RS+1
+
Uh(x) s.t. p ¢ (x ¡ eh) · 0
In an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium the borrower who needs money at time 0 can arrange to
pay back precisely in those states that are easiest for him to pay, or of most interest to the
lender, or both. When markets are incomplete, the borrower has no choice but to pay back in
the proportions speci¯ed by the available assets.
2.3 Incomplete Markets Economy
Suppose now that agents can only trade via a single asset, paying ds 2 R units of the good in
states s = 1;:::;S. Denote agent h's holding of the asset by µh 2 R, and consumption by xh 2
RS+1
+ . The incomplete markets economy is therefore described by (E;d) = ((Uh;eh)h=A;B;d). In
what follows we shall interpret di®erent kinds of debt by di®erent vectors d. Dollar denominated
5debt will be taken to be dA = ~ eA
k~ eAk2; peso debt will be understood as dB = ~ eB
k~ eBk2 and real debt
will be represented by ~ d = (1;:::;1), where kxkn = (
PS
s=1 °sxn
s)1=n for n ¸ 1.
2.4 Incomplete Markets Equilibrium
We de¯ne an incomplete ¯nancial market equilibrium (GEI equilibrium) for (E;d) as a vector
(¼;(xh;µh)h=A;B) of the asset price, consumption and portfolio choices for each agent such that
µA + µB = 0
and for h = A;B,
(xh;µh) 2 argmax(x;µ)2RS+1




s + µds for s = 1;:::;S:
Given an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium (¹ p;(¹ xh)h=A;B) we de¯ne A-D dividends ¹ d 2 RS by
¹ ds = ¹ xA
s ¡ eA
s for s = 1;:::;S:
It is easy to verify that with these dividends ¹ d for the single asset, the economy (E; ¹ d) has a
GEI-equilibrium (¼;(xh;µh)h=A;B) with (xh = ¹ xh)h=A;B as the equilibrium allocation and with
µA = ¡µB = 1.
If there is a dividend d0 such that the economy (E;d0) has a GEI equilibrium (¼;(xh;µh)h=A;B)
with xh = eh and µh = 0; then d0 is called autarkic.
2.5 Comparative Statics and Welfare
Observe that as long as d 6= 0; the scale of d does not matter. Doubling d and replacing each µh
with 1
2µh and ¼ with 2¼ gives the same real equilibrium. Thus nothing is lost if we restrict d to




De¯ne the Welfare correspondence WE : SS¡1 ! R2 by
WE(d) = f(UA(xA);UB(xB)) : 9(¼;µ) such that (¼;(xA;µA);(xB;µB)) is a GEI equilibriumg:
De¯ne the interior equilibrium correspondence W0
E(d) = f(UA(xA);UB(xB)) : xA;xB À
0;9(¼;µ) such that (¼;(xA;µA);(xB;µB)) is a GEI equilibriumg.
Ultimately we wish to describe the whole correspondence WE and compare equilibrium wel-
fare for di®erent speci¯cations of the asset payo®, d. One might imagine that we would get








Figure 1: A welfare correspondence ?
In the picture, peso debt is better for the borrower and dollar debt is better for the lender.
We shall show that in fact (1) in some prominent cases, dollar debt equilibria and peso debt
equilibria are Pareto comparable, (2) when they are Pareto comparable peso debt may be Pareto
worse than dollar debt and (3) when they are not Pareto comparable, it is usually America who
prefers peso debt.
We show that in the quadratic case, peso debt is Pareto better than dollar debt if there are
persistent gains to risk pooling between A and B.
3 Dollar Denominated Debt vs. Local Currency Debt
Dollar denominated debt may be dangerous for a developing country because in those states
when it can least a®ord to pay, it may be called upon to pay the most, in terms of its own currency
or goods. The idea is that when an economy is performing well, its currency is typically strong.
Thus to keep the promise of delivering one U.S. dollar, or its equivalent in pesos, more pesos
will have to be found in those states when the developing country has less production. Of course
7whether more pesos translates into more goods depends on the central bank and the connection
between in°ation and output.
Our formal model so far has no place for money, or for multiple currencies, or for central
banks. In our companion paper (1999) we add a full-°edged monetary sector and multiple cur-
rencies to the underlying world economy, and derive the rates of in°ation, and the exchange rates
endogenously. Here we prefer to keep a simpler reduced form model by taking the connection
between price levels and exchange rates on the one hand, and economic fundamentals on the
other, as exogenous.
We do so for three reasons. First, we do not wish to be bogged down by the added complexity
of a model with multiple currencies, multiple goods, and so on. The connection between asset
design and welfare is complicated enough. Second, there is no universally accepted model of
money. Our study of dollar denominated debt should be independent of the monetary transmis-
sion mechanism between economic activity and price levels. Third, we wish for a theory that
does not involve the complications of central bank policy.
3.1 Price Levels Assumption
We have assumed that the real commodity payo® of dollar debt is dA = ~ eA
k~ eAk2, and of peso debt
is dB = ~ eB
k~ eBk2. This can be rationalized by assuming that the price level of each currency is
inversely proportional to its country's endowment. One can in turn justify such an assumption
with a crude quantity theory of money: if the whole endowment of a country is sold against the
stock of the local currency (and if the supply of money is held constant by the passive central
bank), then indeed price levels will be inversely proportional to endowments.
From the price levels assumption and no-arbitrage, we can deduce that the exchange rate in
each state s for the local currency against the dollar is proportional to eB
s =eA
s : The currency of
each country is then worth the most precisely when its endowment is relatively highest, which
accords with intuition.
3.1.1 Indexed Bonds vs. Real Bonds
Our results can also be interpreted without the price level assumption. We are comparing debt
indexed to Bolivia's output to debt indexed to America's output. Even without any assumptions
on the relation between output and exchange rates, this is an interesting exercise. In many cases
it will be impossible for developing countries to issue debt in their local currency. The country's
central banks can in°uence the exchange rates by in°ating the money supply and can therefore
reduce the real value of local currency debt whenever the debt levels are high. Because of this
moral hazard problem Americans may be unwilling to buy Peso-denominated bonds. If the
bonds are indexed to actual output, however, this problem disappears and such securities could
be actively traded in world markets. Thus in one interpretation of the dividends dA and dB,
we assume the central banks are completely passive, holding money supply ¯xed. In another
8interpretation of the same dividends we assume the central banks are so active that investors
choose to index the debt to real output.
In addition to comparing debt indexed to Bolivia's output to debt indexed to America's
output, we also compare it to the riskless bond, ~ d = ~ 1, i.e., to a security that pays a ¯xed
quantity of the international good in each state.
4 Small Borrower and Risk Neutral Lender
In the classic partial equilibrium model of international ¯nance, the borrower is small and the
lender is risk neutral. Even in this case peso debt is not necessarily better than dollar debt.
Ideally Bolivia would like to pay exclusively when it has the most, not proportionally to how
much it has. The claim that dollar debt is worse for Bolivia than peso debt implicitly relies on
the assumption that dollar debt is even further from the ideal than peso debt.































Ideal debt for Bolivia
Figure 2: Di®erent debt instruments
Bohn (1990) took it for granted that dollar debt could be taken to be equivalent to riskless
debt. As can be seen in Figure 2, that is indeed further from ideal than peso debt. In reality,
dollar debt is far from riskless, and so we consider more general dollar payo®s. In Theorem 1
dollar debt is only assumed to be inversely monotonic with Bolivian endowments. Riskless dollar
9debt is a special case. Bohn also restricted attention to mean-variance utilities for Bolivia, with
a large risk-neutral lender. We show more generally that when America is large and risk neutral,
and Bolivia has any risk-averse von Neumann-Morgenstern utility, peso debt is ex ante better
for Bolivia than dollar debt, provided that dollar debt is inversely monotonic with Bolivian
endowments. This partial equilibrium intuition is probably responsible for the presumption
that peso debt is better for Bolivia than dollar debt.
Theorem 1 Suppose America is risk neutral and large, so that ¼(d) = ±
PS
s=1 °sds is the price
of the asset in any equilibrium with dividends d; where ± > 0. Suppose that dollar debt is
inversely monotonic with Bolivian endowments, ~ eB
s > ~ eB
t ) dA
s · dA
t for all s;t 2 S: Suppose
Bolivia has von Neumann-Morgenstern utility UB(x) = vB(x0) +
PS
s=1 °suB(xs) where uB is
strictly concave. If Bolivia is the borrower, then it is better o® with peso debt than dollar debt
(and better o® with peso debt than riskless debt).
Proof. Suppose in the dollar equilibrium that Bolivia sells µ units of the dollar asset,
obtaining ¯nal consumption ^ xB in period 1: In the peso economy, Bolivia could have sold the
same value of peso debt, guaranteeing it the same consumption in period 0; and consumption ~ xB
in period 1: Then ^ xB¡~ xB = (~ eB¡¸~ eA)¡(~ eB¡¹~ eB) = ¹~ eB¡¸~ eA; which is strictly co-monotonic
with ^ xB and ~ xB: But from the small country pricing hypothesis and the fact that the same value
of debt was sold, we know that E°(^ xB ¡ ~ xB) = 0: Take any vector y on the line from ~ xB to ^ xB:
Then from strict concavity, the vector u0
B(y) is strictly inversely monotonic with ^ xB ¡ ~ xB: But





s ¡ ~ xB
s ) < 0:
Integrating over all y along the line shows that utility is lower at ^ xB than at ~ xB. But this proves
that Bolivia will always do better with Peso debt than dollar debt. ¥
Risk neutrality is an unacceptable hypothesis. American utility will also be a®ected by the
choice of debt. The interest rate on the debt will vary with the quantity of debt issued. America
might be more risk averse than Bolivia and Bolivian endowments and American endowments
might be positively correlated. Theorem 1 does not allow for any of these possibilities.
5 Persistent gains to risk pooling
This leads us to consider generalizations of Theorem 1. What really is a sound basis for the
presumption that peso debt is better for Bolivia than dollar debt? Example 1 shows that it is
not enough that peso debt is more convenient for Bolivia to pay than dollar debt. One must
also take into account which is more attractive to America. One cannot simply drop the risk
neutrality hypothesis from Theorem 1.
10A natural conjecture is that if peso debt is mutually more attractive than dollar debt solely on
the basis of second period preferences, i.e. in terms of their e®ect on the risk pro¯les of America
and Bolivia, then the peso equilibrium will be better than the dollar equilibrium. Unfortunately,
Example 1 also shows that this conjecture is false.
Example 1 Consider quadratic utilities given by °1 = °2 = 0:5 and
vA(x) = uA(x) = x ¡
1
100








2 ) = (10;6;6) and (eB
0 ;eB
1 ;eB
2 ) = (1;4;10)
Note that dollar debt is riskless, so the initial endowments satisfy the endowment condi-
tion of theorem 1. However, both countries are better o® at the dollar equilibrium than at
the peso equilibrium! The equilibrium utilities with the dollar-bond are given by (UA;UB) =
(10:4422;2:7487) while the equilibrium utilities with the peso-bond are given by (UA;UB) =
(10:3213;2:2724). ¥
For an in¯nitesimal debt, America values peso debt relative to dollar debt more than Bolivia
does, in Example 1. At the initial endowments America is locally risk neutral, and values any
in¯nitesimal trade according to its expected value, while Bolivia is risk averse and willing to sell
a promise for less than its expected value whenever this trade reduces the variance of second
period consumption, i.e.
MUA ¢ ~ eA
MUA ¢ ~ eB =
(1 ¡ 6=50;1 ¡ 6=50) ¢ (6;6)
(1 ¡ 6=50;1 ¡ 6=50) ¢ (4;10)
= :857
MUB ¢ ~ eA
MUB ¢ ~ eB =
(1 ¡ 4=500;1 ¡ 10=500) ¢ (6;6)
(1 ¡ 4=500;1 ¡ 10=500) ¢ (4;10)
= :859
Thus in Example 1 peso debt is mutually more attractive than dollar debt, yet dollar debt
is Pareto superior. To understand how this could be, notice that the quantity of debt issued by
Bolivia (and therefore held by America) depends primarily on Bolivia's desire to obtain wealth
sooner in exchange for wealth later, and much less on Bolivia's preferences about future risk.
At the ¯rst stages of lending, America is relatively more risk tolerant for exposure to Bolivian
GNP °uctuations, but as America takes on more of it (and Bolivia correspondingly less of it),
America becomes relatively less tolerant. Yet America continues to take on still more Bolivian
debt because the di®erent time preferences of the two countries justi¯es it. But quite soon
America cannot bear any more exposure to the risky Bolivian debt, and the exploitation of
intertemporal gains to trade is curtailed. With dollar debt, America can tolerate much more
exposure, and so more of the intertemporal gains to trade can be reaped.
In generalizing Theorem 1, we have in mind country A as a large country and B as a smaller
developing country. B is borrowing from A because it is relatively poor at present. We wish
11to assume that in addition to this intertemporal source of gains to trade, there is also a risk
sharing source of gains to trade, that persists even after A absorbs the small debt of country B.
Risk neutrality guaranteed that persistence, but it can be obtained from weaker hypotheses.
Inspection of the proof of Theorem 1 reveals a simple idea: no matter how much peso debt
Bolivia has given up, there is an advantageous trade in which Bolivia gives up more peso debt in
exchange for dollar debt from America. Since this does not involve any trade-o® of consumption
across time, we associate it with risk pooling, and since it must remain true even after Bolivia
gives up some debt, we call it a persistent gains to risk pooling assumption:
(Persistent Gains to Risk Pooling). At any second period allocation (~ xA; ~ xB) = (~ eA +






















The persistent gains to risk pooling hypothesis implies that both countries would gain if A
gave up a fraction of last period endowment in exchange for an appropriate fraction of B's last
period endowment. Moreover, this risk sharing opportunity persists even after B transfers some
of its endowment to A.
One way to ensure the persistent gains to risk pooling hypothesis, without making any
assumptions on utility, is to suppose
(Endowment Generated Persistent Gains to Risk Pooling). ~ eA and ~ eB are inversely
monotonically related, and aggregate endowment ~ eA+~ eB is inversely monotonically related to ~ eB.
This also is consistent with the idea that America is much bigger than Bolivia. The following
lemma shows the connection between these two assumptions.
Lemma 1 Endowment Generated Persistent Gains to Risk Pooling implies Persistent Gains to
Risk Pooling.
Proof.










































































which proves the lemma. ¥
The persistent gains to risk pooling hypothesis covers other cases as well.
Theorem 2 Assume that Persistent Gains to Risk Pooling holds. Let (¼(dA);(xh(dA);µh(dA))h=A;B)
be an equilibrium for the dollar debt economy (E;dA); and let (¼(dB);(xh(dB);µh(dB))h=A;B)
be an equilibrium for the peso economy (E;dB): Then for at least one agent h 2 fA;Bg;
Uh(xh(dB)) ¸ Uh(xh(dA)):
In fact, let d¸ =
¸~ eA+(1¡¸)~ eB
k¸~ eA+(1¡¸)~ eBk2, and let (¼(¸);(xh(¸);µh(¸))h=A;B) be the corresponding
equilibrium. Then if ¸1 > ¸2 ¸ 0, for some h 2 fA;Bg, Uh(xh(¸2)) ¸ Uh(xh(¸1)).
The proof is deferred to the appendix. The proof proceeds by showing that with persistent
gains to risk pooling, any allocation achievable via dollar debt can be Pareto-dominated by an
allocation achievable via peso debt, without even changing ¯rst period consumption. Theorem
2 then follows from the constrained e±ciency of equilibrium with one consumption good.
By assuming risk-neutrality for the lender, Theorem 1 focused attention on the borrower,
since the lender will necessarily be indi®erent to the currency of the debt. Theorem 2, on the
other hand, treats the lender and borrower symmetrically, guaranteeing that at least one of them
is better o® with peso debt, but making no presumption that it is Bolivia that bene¯ts from
peso debt. In fact, Theorem 1 is not so asymmetric; it really concludes that peso debt Pareto
dominates dollar debt. In generalizing Theorem 1 it will be important to see whether Bolivia
gains from peso debt because everyone gains, or whether peso debt enables Bolivia to gain at
the expense of America.
To answer this question we must make assumptions about utilities. We shall see that when
utilities are quadratic, persistent gains to risk pooling is enough to guarantee that peso debt
is better for Bolivia; but only because peso debt is also better for America. For linear-concave
utilities, we will show that it is America, not Bolivia, that always prefers Bolivia to issue peso
debt (when there are endowment generated persistent gains to risk sharing). Bolivia might be
worse o® with peso debt. In the following example, endowment generated persistent gains to
risk pooling holds, yet America gains from peso debt and Bolivia loses.
Example 2 There are two states, identical probabilities °1 = °2 = 0:5. Endowments are given
by eB(0) = 1;eB(1) = 4;eB(2) = 9 and eA(0) = 1;eA(1) = 8;eA(2) = 3 . We assume that both







13Utility levels in the dollar equilibrium are (UA;UB) = (0:9420;1:0103) while in the peso equi-
librium they are (UA;UB) = (0:9701;1:0091). The price of the bond is 0:426 in the dollar
equilibrium but only 0:219 in the peso equilibrium; the expected return in the dollar equilibrium
is equal to 2.2 while it the peso equilibrium it rises to 4.3. ¥
An explanation for example 2 is given in Section 7.
6 Quadratic utility
6.1 The welfare correspondence
Suppose now that both agents have quadratic utility functions of the form




vh(x) = ®hx ¡
1
2
¯hx2; h = A;B
uh(x) = ahx ¡
1
2





where the constants ®h > 0, ah > 0 and constants bh > 0 and ¯h ¸ 0 are assumed to guarantee
that utility is increasing in the relevant range. The last condition holds whenever agents have
time independent utility vh = uh, or time dependent utility with the same discount factor,
uh = ±vh or linear quadratic utility ¯h = 0:





h(xs). It will be increased
by multiplying ah and bh by some constant ± < 1. The Arrow-Pratt risk aversion of an agent at








ah ¡ bh¹ x
can be increased by raising bh by ² > 0 and ah by ²¹ x, without a®ecting marginal utility at ¹ x.
The next theorem shows that the common presumption that peso debt bene¯ts Bolivia and
dollar debt bene¯ts America is wrong, at least when utilities are quadratic.
14Theorem 3 With quadratic utilities, there is (at most) one interior equilibrium corresponding
to each economy (E;d): Furthermore, the interior equilibria arising from all economies f(E;d) :
d 2 SS¡1g are Pareto comparable. In fact, the welfare graph, Graph(W0
E) lies on a straight line.





















Figure 3: A welfare graph for quadratic utility
Proof. De¯ne a pre-equilibrium for (E;d) as as a tuple (¼;(xh;µh)h=A;B) for which the ¯rst or-
der conditions for utility maximization hold, and demand equals supply (but for which we might
have xh negative). Any interior equilibrium must be a pre-equilibrium. In a pre-equilibrium,
(®h ¡ ¯hxh














~ 1 ¡ ~ xh) ¢° d:
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where the last two equalities hold because of market clearing. It follows that
¼ = [(a~ 1 ¡ ~ e) ¢° d]=(® ¡ ke0) = ! ¢° d
where ! ´ (a~ 1 ¡ ~ e)=(® ¡ ke0) does not depend on d: Thus pre-equilibrium price ¼ is a linear
function of d. In particular there is at most a single pre-equilibrium, and hence a single interior
equilibrium.
The e®ect on price ¼ of a change in dividends d ! d+¢ is easy to compute from the above
formula: D¢¼ = !¢°¢. From the envelope theorem, the e®ect on utility is also easy to compute.
It is the same as the e®ect on utility if the agent did not change his portfolio µh, and simply
paid the extra price for buying the same portfolio and then consumed the extra dividends.
D¢Uh = f¡(®h ¡ ¯hxh
0)[D¢¼] + (ah~ 1 ¡ bh~ xh) ¢° ¢gµh
= µhf¡(®h ¡ ¯hxh
0)! + (ah~ 1 ¡ bh~ xh)g ¢° ¢















~ 1 ¡ ~ xh)g ¢° ¢
= f¡(® ¡ ke0)! + (a~ 1 ¡ ~ e)g ¢° ¢
= 0 ¢° ¢ = 0:





for all dividends d and all perturbations ¢: We conclude that in pre-equilibrium, utilities vary
along a straight line in utility space as d varies. A fortiori, the same holds for interior equilibria.
¥
Figure 3 shows a typical welfare graph for quadratic utility. The equilibrium utilities
(¹ UA; ¹ UB), achieved with Arrow-Debreu dividends ¹ d Pareto dominate all other equilibria. The
16autarky equilibrium utilities, (UA
0 ;UB
0 ), achieved with d0 are Pareto-dominated by all other
equilibria.
The theorem shows that
¹ UA ¡ UA
0
bA =
¹ UB ¡ UB
0
bB :
However it does not say anything about where on the line W(dA) lies relative to W(dB).
Combining theorems 2 and 3 gives a su±cient condition under which both America and
Bolivia will be better o® with peso debt.
Corollary 1 If utility is quadratic and persistent gains to risk pooling holds, then peso debt
Pareto dominates dollar debt, if both equilibria are interior.
6.2 Linear quadratic utility
The presumption has been that because dollar debt exacerbates crises, it must be better to
borrow through peso debt (in the absence of central bank uncertainty). But from an ex ante
perspective, this ignores the preferences of lenders. It is imaginable, for example, that Bolivia
has a riskier GNP than America, but that Bolivians are more tolerant to additional risk than
Americans. Paying in pesos might be better for Bolivians but so much worse for Americans that
equilibrium interest rates would need to be so high that even Bolivia is worse o® with peso debt.
Indeed we will show that with linear quadratic utilities, if America has riskless endowments,
then peso debt is Pareto-worse when America is su±ciently risk averse and Bolivia is su±ciently
impatient.
For the linear quadratic case we can completely characterize the welfare rankings of dividends
d 2 SS¡1. This therefore gives us su±cient conditions for the Pareto superiority of dollar debt.
Assume now that agents' utilities are given by












Theorem 4 Suppose lenders and borrowers have linear-quadratic utilities. Given two dividends
d1;d2 2 SS¡1, suppose that A is the lender (µA > 0) in the equilibria for (E;d1) and (E;d2), and
that both equilibria are interior. Then the equilibrium allocation with d2 will Pareto-dominate











The utility of an asset purchase of µh is
V h(µh) = eh
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s °sbAeA
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s °sbBeB







s = 1, we obtain
V A(µA) + V B(¡µA) =
UA(eA) + µAu0
A(~ eA) ¢° d ¡ 1
2(µA)2bA + UB(eB) ¡ µAu0
B(~ eB) ¢° d ¡ 1
2(µA)2bB =
UA(eA) + UB(eB) + µA(u0
A(~ eA) ¡ u0
B(~ eB)) ¢° d ¡ 1
2(µA)2(bA + bB)
We know that with linear quadratic utilities (pre) equilibrium will maximize the sum of
utilities. Di®erentiating the last expression for the sum of utilities, and solving for µA to make
the expression zero gives equilibrium
µA =
(u0
A(~ eA) ¡ u0
B(~ eB)) ¢° d
bA + bB
Plugging equilibrium µA into the last expression gives




A(~ eA) ¡ u0
B(~ eB)) ¢° d]2
bA + bB :
A change of dividends which increases the sum of both agents' utilities must make at least one
agent better o®. But Theorem 3 implies that then both agents must be better o®. ¥
Theorem 4 is remarkable since it shows that with linear-quadratic utilities, one can rank
di®erent assets just by the knowledge of marginal utility at individual endowments, knowing
only that equilibrium consumptions are interior. Peso debt is Pareto better than dollar debt
if and only if, starting from their initial endowments, there is an incentive for an in¯nitesimal
trade in which America buys (dB ¡ dA) from Bolivia. Another proof of Theorem 4 is given in
Section 7.









s ) > 0
the Peso Surplus Condition. Theorem 4 proves that with linear quadratic utility, peso debt
Pareto dominates dollar debt if and only if the peso surplus condition holds.
The condition is guaranteed by persistent gains to risk pooling and interiority of equilibrium.
It is not implied by gains to risk pooling at the endowment point alone.
Theorem 4 does not hold if ¯rst period utility is also quadratic. This is illustrated in Example
1.
186.3 When dollar debt is riskless
An interesting special case of Theorem 4 occurs when American endowments are riskless, ~ eA = k~ 1

















Hence if Bolivia is su±ciently impatient (which is achieved by multiplying u0
B by ± < 1) then









s ) > 0:
By Theorem 4, this implies that dollar debt is Pareto better than peso debt, provided that
both equilibria are interior. Taking America close to risk neutral, we seem to get a contradiction
to Theorem 1, which shows that peso debt is necessarily better for Bolivia. The paradox is
resolved by noticing that equilibrium will not be interior. Interiority can be guaranteed by
ensuring that the trade µA is su±ciently small, which in turn is guaranteed if bA is very big.
Corollary 2 Suppose







s]; h = A;B
If American endowments are riskless (so that eA
s = k for all s = 1;:::;S) and Bolivia's en-
dowments are risky, then dollar debt Pareto dominates peso debt if Bolivian impatience and
American risk aversion are su±ciently high. More precisely, if we replace (aB;bB) by (±aB;±bB)
and (aA;bA) by (aA +k²;bA +²), then there is ¹ ± > 0 and ¹ ² > 0 such that for all ± · ¹ ± and ² ¸ ¹ ²,
both equilibria are interior and dollar debt Pareto dominates peso debt.
This corollary captures the general equilibrium intuition discussed in the introduction. Bo-
livia, stimulated by the attractive form of peso debt, will be led to borrow more and more,
driving up the interest rate, and making itself worse o® than it would have been with dollar
debt.
7 Who Does Peso Debt Really Help ? The Linear-Concave Case
When utilities are quadratic, there is agreement between A and B about which currency to use
as debt. When utilities are not quadratic, disagreement might arise. In that case, who stands
to gain by switching from dollar debt to peso debt ? As Example 2 suggests, it is paradoxically
America, not Bolivia, that gains from peso debt if persistent gains to risk pooling holds.
We shall show that in the linear-concave case, whenever u000
h ¸ 0 for both h = A and h = B,
America must gain from the switch from dollar debt to peso debt, while Bolivia might gain or
lose, provided that there are endowment generated persistent gains to risk sharing. The reason
19is that the price of debt must move unfavorably for Bolivia, and if this e®ect is big enough,
it can dwarf the gain Bolivia receives from being able to pay in pesos. America bene¯ts both
from receiving peso debt, and from the favorable price move. This conclusion is con¯rmed by
Example 2 (where aggregate supply is constant across states, so there are endowment generated
persistent gains to risk pooling).
To prove this result, we introduce our argument by reexamining the linear-quadratic case
from a di®erent point of view.
7.1 The Linear-Quadratic Case
Assume that agents' ¯rst period utility is linear in consumption, i.e., Uh(x) = x0+
PS
s=1 °suh(xs).
In this case, we can give our problem an easy intuitive interpretation.
The agents' marginal utilities for the asset can be associated with their demand and supply
curves for the asset. The in¯nitesimal surplus from trading an in¯nitesimal amount of the asset






s ) ¡ u0
B(eB
s )]ds:
Furthermore, the utility of ¯nal consumption for the borrower is equal to the producer surplus
(plus a constant equal to the utility of the initial endowment allocation), and the utility of ¯nal
consumption for the lender is given by the consumer surplus (plus a constant equal to the utility
of the initial endowment allocation). We can easily examine how the producer and consumer-
surplus changes as the asset structure changes. As the dividend-promise becomes less onerous
for the borrower, the supply curve shifts outward as indicated in Figure 4. The demand curve
of the lender may shift in or out, depending on whether the new asset dividend is more or less
attractive to him.
The peso surplus condition implies that the move from dollar debt to peso debt spreads the
demand and supply curves further apart at the initial endowments. But the equilibrium price
also moves, and the change could be so great that the borrower loses in the end, even if total
surplus increases. We shall see below that when utilities are linear quadratic, the marginal util-
ities are linear and so supply and demand curves are linear. By normalizing dividends d so that
kdk2 = 1, we guarantee that the slope of the supply curve is equal to the quadratic coe±cient
bB, irrespective of the dividend (and similarly for the demand curve). Thus changing from dollar
debt to peso debt causes parallel shifts in the supply and demand curves, as illustrated in Figure
4. If the shifts in demand and supply are both parallel, then from elementary economics we
know that total surplus must increase whenever in¯nitesimal surplus increases. Furthermore,








Figure 4: Supply and demand in the linear-quadratic case
7.1.1 Another proof of Theorem 4:
The utility of an asset purchase of µh is
eh























where we have used the normalization
PS
s=1 °sd2
s = 1: Supply and demand are indeed linear.
The change in marginal utility from an in¯nitesimal change in the direction ¢ of the asset
























Notice that the change in marginal utility does not depend on µ; hence a change in assets cre-
ates a parallel move in the demand and supply curves for the asset. Furthermore, by integrating









s ) for each h = A;B:
Equilibrium trade then changes by (§A ¡ §B)=(bA + bB), and so total surplus changes by
1
2(§A¡§B)2=(bA+bB). Thus total welfare increases if and only if the demand and supply curve
move further apart, that is if











s ) > 0:
It follows from elementary economics (or from Theorem 3) that if total welfare increases each
agent's welfare must increase as well. ¥
7.2 Why America Gains and Bolivia Might Lose Switching from Dollar Debt
to Peso Debt: The Linear-Concave Case
Let us return to the more general case of linear-concave utilities, dropping our restriction that
uh is quadratic. Supply and demand curves are typically not linear and the shifts of demand and
supply are typically not parallel. They depend on the third derivative of the utility functions.
Let us impose the relatively weak assumption that u
000
h ¸ 0; which is satis¯ed by most of the
popular von Neumann{Morgenstern utilities. This allows us to derive the following theorem.
Theorem 5 Suppose that utilities are linear-concave with u000
h ¸ 0; for both A and B, and
suppose endowments satisfy the endowment generated persistent gains to risk pooling hypothesis.
Suppose also that for all d =
®dA+(1¡®)dB
k®dA+(1¡®)dBk2, 0 · ® · 1, the resulting equilibrium is interior.
Then a switch from dA to dB necessarily makes America better o®.
22To prove the theorem, observe that an in¯nitesimal change in dividends has two e®ects on
welfare: the direct e®ect of paying in a di®erent asset, holding previous trade levels ¯xed, and
the indirect e®ect induced by a change in the equilibrium price. The change in the equilibrium
price can be obtained by linearizing marginal utility (the supply and demand curves) around
the equilibrium and then moving them in parallel according to how much marginal utility is
a®ected by the dividend change at the original equilibrium trade levels. A change, therefore,
that depresses marginal utility for both agents, without directly a®ecting utility, will depress
the price and help America and hurt Bolivia, since America is the buyer and Bolivia the seller.
Suppose that at the original equilibrium consumption, the marginal utility of peso debt were
higher to America than the marginal utility of dollar debt, and the reverse were true in Bolivia.
Then an in¯nitesimal change from dollar debt towards peso debt would help both countries
directly. In addition, the demand and supply curves would tend to move further apart, since
holding previous consumption ¯xed, the marginal utility of the new asset is higher to America
and lower for Bolivia.
But marginal utility also moves because previous consumption is now changed at the original
trade levels (more peso consumption for America and less for Bolivia). We shall show that this
last change lowers marginal utility for both countries, without a®ecting utility directly, provided
that u000
h ¸ 0. Thus the price is depressed and Bolivia might lose.
More formally, the marginal utility to Bolivia from not selling another promise of d (after



































The change in marginal utilities from an in¯nitesimal change ¢ in the asset payouts is


























23The following lemma allows us to sign the terms involving second derivatives.
Lemma 2 Suppose the endowment generated gains to risk pooling hypothesis holds, and that
0 ¿ µd = ¸~ eA + ¹~ eB + º~ 1 ¿ ~ eB; ¸;¹;º ¸ 0:
Suppose that
¢ = ¯~ eB ¡ ®~ eA ¡ °~ 1; ®;¯;° ¸ 0
and suppose that
PS













s + µds)ds¢s · 0:
Proof of the lemma.
Observe that the random variable ¢s has expectation zero with respect to the positive measure
°sds. Since u000
A ¸ 0; the random variable u
00
A(eA
s + µds) is monotonic in eA
s + µds. From the
endowment generated gains to risk pooling hypothesis, and the assumption that 0 ¿ µd =
¸~ eA+¹~ eB +º~ 1 ¿ ~ eB; ¸;¹;º ¸ 0, we know that eA
s +µds varies co-monotonically with eA
s and
hence inversely with ¢s: The covariance of any two inversely monotonic random variables, with





s +µds)ds¢s · 0: The
proof for B is analogous (the sign is reversed because ~ eB ¡ µd is co-monotonic with ¢ but then
reversed again because of the ¡µ). ¥
Proof of the theorem.
From elementary economics, we know the change in price is
D¢¼ =
§A¾B + §B¾A
¾A + ¾B :
By the envelope theorem, the change in utility coming entirely from the di®erence in dividend
payo®s (ignoring the price e®ect) is














By the envelope theorem the total change in utility is just the sum of these two e®ects,
D¢Uh(µ) = µhD¢¼ + ¹ D¢Uh(µ); h = A;B:
Thus the terms in Lemma 2 a®ect marginal utility without a®ecting utility.
24Letting § = §A ¡ §B; and ¾ = ¾A + ¾B, the total change in utility (including the price
change) from an in¯nitesimal change in dividends of ¢ is















































































¾ ¾B and µ§
¾ ¾A represent the change in utility that would arise if the shifts in demand












Hence if D¢UB ¸ 0 then necessarily D¢UA ¸ 0. By Theorem 2, one of the terms must
be greater or equal to zero whenever ¢ is inversely monotonically related to ~ eA + µd. Thus
D¢UA ¸ 0 for any µd and ¢ satisfying the conditions of Lemma 2.
Now take d =
¸~ eA+¹~ eB
k¸~ eA+¹~ eBk2, ¸;¹ ¸ 0, and take ¢ = ¯~ eB ¡®~ eA, where ® ¸ 0;¯ ¸ 0 are chosen
so that d¢° ¢ = 0 and k¢k2 = 1. Then ¢ is tangent to SS¡1 and points in the direction from d
to dB. Clearly ¢ is inversely monotonically related to ~ eA + µd. So the conditions of Lemma 2
are satis¯ed. Integrating over d around the circle from dA to dB then gives welfare gains for A. ¥
The proof of Theorem 5 can be used to prove the following corollary (except now ¢ can be
taken to be of the form ¯dB ¡ °~ 1).
Corollary 3 Under the conditions of Theorem 5, moving from d = ~ d = ~ 1 to peso debt makes
America better o®.
258 Pareto-Improving Credit Controls
So far we have assumed that the purchasing power of a dollar in Bolivian goods is simply
proportional to American output. In reality, it depends on many other factors. To capture
some of this, we now assume that the purchasing power of the dollar in Bolivia increases when
Bolivian output declines and that this e®ect becomes stronger the more debt Bolivia issues.
This assumption is surely consistent with the facts, at least in crises when developing coun-
tries have issued so much dollar debt that they are close to defaulting. One then typically
observes that the purchasing power of the dollar soars as local income collapses.
We model this by assuming that d depends on aggregate debt:
(Debt Level Dependent Dollar Hypothesis).
d = d(µA) =
g(µA)~ eA + (1 ¡ g(µA))~ eB
kg(µA)~ eA + (1 ¡ g(µA)~ eB)k2
where g : R ! R is assumed to be a smooth and strictly increasing function of trades, µA, with
d(µA) À 0 for all µA.
The dependence of the real payo®s from dollar debt on the quantity of debt gives a rationale
for credit controls. By limiting the amount of dollar debt that is issued, the government can
a®ect the real payo®s of the asset, and thus improve welfare.
Indeed, the American government in our model might also be sympathetic to capital controls
because they can improve American welfare. Contrary to popular opinion, the interests of both
lender and borrower are often aligned.
We consider credit controls in the form of taxes on transactions, i.e. we assume that there
are tax rates ¿B on selling an asset and ¿A on buying an asset. We also introduce transfers TB
to borrowers and TA to lenders which satisfy
TB = jµBj¿B; TA = jµAj¿A:
With µB < 0, the agents' ¯rst period budget constraints then become:
xB
0 = eB
0 + TB ¡ (¼ ¡ ¿B)µB and xA
0 = eA
0 + TA ¡ (¼ + ¿A)µA:
Since there is a continuum of each type of agent, individual choices of µh do not a®ect transfers.
Theorem 6 Assume linear quadratic utilities and the debt level dependent dollar hypothesis.
If America is the lender, if the persistent gains to risk pooling assumption holds, and if the
equilibrium is interior, then taxes of ¿A = ²bB per unit of asset purchases, and ¿B = ²bA per
unit of asset sales are Pareto improving for small enough ² > 0.
Proof. Let (¼;(ch
0;~ ch;µh)h=A;B) be the original dollar equilibrium for the original economy,
E, and let (¼;(ch
0;~ ch;µh)h=A;B) be the equilibrium for the economy E after the imposition of
26the taxes (¿A;¿B) = (²bB;²bA). Let d = d(µA) be the original dollar debt payo®s in terms of
Bolivian goods, and let d = d(µA) be the dollar payo®s with new trade levels.
First we argue that trade goes down:
µA = ¡µB < µA = µB:
Suppose otherwise. Then, since taxes decrease trade, trade would also have increased in the
equilibrium of the economy E¤ when the dollar payo®s are ¯xed at d, but no tax is imposed.
But we know from the second proof of Theorem 4 that utility must then be higher for both
agents in E¤ than in E. But then, by Theorem 2, g(µA) < g(µA), a contradiction to µA > µA
and the monotonicity of g.
With µA < µA, we know that g(µA) < g(µA), so by Theorem 2 at least one agent is better
o® in E¤ then in E, and so by Theorem 3 both agents are better o® in E¤ then in E.
We shall now argue from the envelope theorem that for very small ², the utilities in E are
equal (up to a ¯rst order) to the utilities in E¤, and hence strictly higher than the utilities in
E. Notice that the equilibrium in E is identical to the equilibrium that would result if in the
economy E¤ (with ¯xed dividends d) taxes of ²bB and ²bA were imposed. Notice further that
with the chosen taxes supply and demand move precisely so that the price ¼ in E net of taxes
must be identical to the equilibrium price ¼¤ in E¤. The loss of income from the tax is just
compensated by the transfers TA = µA²bB and TB = ¡µB²bA. Finally, if ² is very small, there is
no additional (¯rst order) loss in utility from the reduction in trade µA = ¡µB < µA = µB. ¥
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9 Appendix
We prove several lemmas to facilitate the proof of theorem 2.
Given an arbitrary dividend d 2 RS, we say that an allocation (yA;yB) is achievable via d if






~ yA = ~ eA + µd
~ yB = ~ eB ¡ µd
The following constrained e±ciency theorem is standard, with one good per state.
Lemma 3 Any equilibrium allocation to an economy (E;d), with only one consumption good
per state, is constrained Pareto-optimal, i.e., there is no allocation (yA;yB) achievable via d
which Pareto dominates an equilibrium allocation (xA(d);xB(d)) of (E;d).




s=1 °suh(xs) by ~ Uh(x), for any h 2 fA;Bg:
Lemma 4 Given any second period allocation (c) = (cA;cB) 2 R2S
++ with cA = ~ eA + ®dB,
cB = ~ eB ¡ ®dB, there are no °1;°2 > 0 such that
~ UA(cA ¡ °1dB + °2dA) > ~ UA(cA) and ~ UB(cB + °1dB ¡ °2dA) > ~ UB(cB):
Proof. By the assumption of persistent gains to risk-sharing, there must exist an allocation
^ cA = cA ¡ °1dB + °2dA and ^ cB = cB + °1dB ¡ °2dA, °1;°2 > 0, which is Pareto-dominated by
(c), i.e. ~ Uh(^ ch) < ~ Uh(ch) for both h = 1;2.
Suppose there is an allocation (c) with cA = cA ¡®1dB +®2dA and cB = cB +®1dB ¡®2dA
for some ®1;®2 > 0 such that ~ Uh(ch) > ~ Uh(ch) for both h = 1;2. If (c) Pareto-dominates (c),
28so will ¸c + (1 ¡ ¸)c for ¸ 2 [0;1). But this implies that we can scale (®1;®2) by
°1
®1, and hence
there has to be a ± = ®2
°1
®1 > 0 such that cA¡°1dB+±dA and cB+°1dB¡±dA Pareto dominates
(c). Since it Pareto-dominates (c) it must also Pareto-dominate ^ c. By strict monotonicity, this
is impossible. Either ± · °2 in which case cA ¡ °1dB + ±dA · ^ cA or ± > °2 in which case
cB + °1dB ¡ ±dA < ^ cB. A contradiction. ¥
Lemma 5 Let d = ¸dA + (1 ¡ ¸)dB, for any ¸ > 0. Let (x) 2 R2S
++ satisfy xA = ~ eA + ®d,
xB = ~ eB¡®d. Then there exists an allocation (zA;zB) 2 R2S
+ with zA = ~ eA+°dB, zB = ~ eB¡°dB
for some ° such that (z) Pareto-dominates (x), i.e., such that
~ UA(zA) > ~ UA(xA) and ~ UB(zB) > ~ UB(xB):
Proof. Denote by (cA;cB) 2 IR2S
+ the unique allocation which satis¯es ~ UA(cA) = ~ UA(xA) and
cA = ~ eA + ¸dB, cB = ~ eB ¡ ¸dB for some ¸ > 0 (this allocation must exist by monotonicity).
By Lemma 4, (c) cannot be Pareto-dominated by (x) or by any point on the line connecting (c)
with (x). By strict concavity, it must then hold that ~ UB(cB) > ~ UB(xB). By monotonicity there
exists the allocation, (z), which Pareto-dominates (x). ¥
Bolivia
America





Figure 5: The Edgeworth-box
Figure 5 illustrates lemmas 4 and 5. The gains to risk pooling assumption requires that the
contract curve lies above the line connecting the origin to Bolivian endowments. With this, the
29proof of Theorem 2 is straightforward:
Proof of Theorem 2. By Lemmas 4 and 5 there must be an allocation z 2 R2S
+ , zA = ~ eA+°dB,




for h = A;B and (xh
0;zh)h=A;B Pareto-dominates the allocation (x). But if (xh
0;zh)h=A;B 6= y,
since (xh
0;zh)h=A;B is a feasible allocation for the economy E = ((eh;uh)h=A;B;¯;¼;f) and by
Lemma 3, there must be at least one agent h for which Uh(yh) > Uh(xh
0;zh). If we replace dA
by arbitrary d = ¸dA +(1¡¸)dB À 0 for any ¸ > 0 exactly the same argument shows that any
allocation achievable via d can be Pareto-dominated by an allocation achievable via dB. But
then we can repeat the same argument using d in place of dB, giving Theorem 2. ¥
30